Markus Vinzent's Blog

Friday, 17 April 2015

Higher Chances of Surviving Ovarian Cancer through the right Diet and Physical Activity: New Research

In a previous blog, 4 years ago, I gathered medical reports about forms of diet that recognised medical studies have suggested to have an impact on the survival rate and length of Ovarian Cancer patients. Having done some further research on this topic, I am not suggesting to reject or even replace standard medical treatments, as some do, although elements of what, for example, cancer survivors like journalist and media entrepreneur Evita Ramparte live on are certainly reflective of medical studies (emphasising fresh, organic fruit and vegetables, less red meat etc.). While a positive attitude, not to focus on the cancer, but rather on the rebalancing of one's own life seems vital, one of the important suggestions which seem shared by medical studies is the impact of sports.


In an important study and report on ‘nutrition during and after Cancer therapy’, Stephanie Barrera and Wendy Demark-Wahnefried published in Oncology (Williston Park) 23 (2009 Feb) (2 Suppl): 15–21, found out that ‘diet and nutritional factors play a large role in influencing both the quality and quantity of life after the diagnosis of cancer. The oncology nurse is well-positioned to: 1) oversee that the nutritional needs of patients who are newly-diagnosed, undergoing active treatment, or those with advanced disease are met; 2) facilitate referrals of patients with more intensive nutritional needs to registered dietitians; and 3) promote the importance of weight management and a healthful plant-based diet, low in saturated fat and simple sugars, and high in fruits and vegetables and unrefined whole grains, to patients who are likely to join the ranks of ever-expanding population of cancer survivors who now constitute roughly 4% of the U.S. population and who number over 11 million’. In more detail, they show that ‘Current guidelines advocate a modest rate of weight loss (no more than two pounds per week) during the time of treatment among patients who are overweight or obese, as long as it meets with oncologist approval. Guidelines established for weight management in the general population should be applied to cancer survivors, and should include not only caloric restriction and increased energy expenditure through exercise, but also behavior therapy. While modest rates of weight loss can be achieved by portion control and by substituting low-energy density foods (e.g., water-rich vegetables, fruits, whole grains, and broth-based soups) for foods that are higher in calories, more structured and intensive programs that include exercise and promote energy deficits of up to 1,000 calories/day may yield better results. Previous studies have found exercise to be a strong predictor of weight loss among cancer survivors. Accumulating evidence also suggests that physical activity may independently affect the course of colorectal and breast cancer, and also affects the risk of secondary cancers at each of these sites, as well as for endometrial cancers.’

 

Further resources on dietary recommendations:

Resource links for dietary recommendations

American Heart Association
American Diabetes Association
American Dietetic Association
Caring 4Cancer
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
American Institute for Cancer Research
National Institute of Health, National Heart Lung and Blood Institute
Office of Cancer Complementary and Alternative Medicine

 
Elisa V. Bandera, Lawrence H. Kushi and Lorna Rodriguez-Rodriguez published another interesting article on ‘Nutritional Factors in Ovarian Cancer Survival’ in the journal Nutrition and Cancer 61/5 (2009): 580-586. First they show that relatively little research has been done in this area and they mention the following studies:

-       Yang , L , Klint , A , Lambe , M , Bellocco , R Riman , T . 2008. Predictors of ovarian cancer survival: a population-based prospective study in Sweden. Int J Cancer, 123: 672–679.

-       Nagle , C M , Purdie , D M , Webb , P M , Green , A Harvey , P W . 2003. Dietary influences on survival after ovarian cancer. Int J Cancer, 106: 264–269.

-       Zhang , M , Lee , A H , Binns , C W and Xie , X . 2004. Green tea consumption enhances survival of Zhang , M , Lee , A H , Binns , C W and Xie , X . 2004. Green tea consumption enhances survival of Zhang , M , Lee , A H , Binns , C W and Xie , X . 2004. Green tea consumption enhances survival of epithelial ovarian cancer. Int J Cancer, 112: 465–469.
Zhang , M , Lee , A H , Binns , C W and Xie , X . 2004. Green tea consumption enhances survival of epithelial ovarian cancer. Int J Cancer, 112: 465–469.


The main focus, then of this article is on the BMI (Body Mass Index) with its evaluation of the impact of obesity on stage of disease at diagnosis, as well as its effect on survival: ‘Survival analyses need to include important covariates, such as age, stage, grade, histologic type, presence of ascites, and treatment information. Of relevance is not just weight or BMI prediagnosis or at the time of diagnosis but also during and after treatment’. Again, there are only a limited number of studies to have dealt with this issue that filtered into the above mentioned guidelines.
 

More, however has been done on physical activity and ovarian cancer survivors, although most older studies deal with physical activity and cancer prevention and much more research needs to be done on this topic. Yet, recently an important study appeared as hard copy and ebook on physical activity and cancer with a special chapter by Karen M. Gil (et al.) on ‘Physical Activity and Gynecologic Cancer Survivorship’ (pp. 305-15). The chapter concludes that, although, physical activity improves life’s quality, the impact on overall survival has not been established yet and needs further research.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=QO9DX8eBOscC&pg=PA183&dq=ovarian+cancer+physical+activity&hl=en&sa=X&ei=G_cwVbW5NI6tacuzgfgF&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=ovarian%20cancer%20physical%20activity&f=false
Similar results can be found in the study by Vivian E. von Gruenigen, Heidi E. Frasure, Mary Beth Kavanagh, Edith Lerner, Steven E. Waggoner and Kerry S. Courneya who have published their study onivian E. von GruenigenSearch for articles by this author
'Feasibility of a lifestyle intervention for ovarian cancer patients receiving adjuvant chemotherapy’, Gynecologic Oncology 122/2 (2011): 328-33.

The result of their study was that with 27 patients enrolled there was a ‘moderate to strenuous physical activity’ which ‘was correlated with higher physical well-being during chemotherapy’. And they conclude that ‘Lifestyle counseling during adjuvant chemotherapy for ovarian cancer is feasible and may improve physical activity and diet quality’. To learn more, they suggest further trials.

Likewise, Stevinson, Clare PhD*; Steed, Helen MD†; Faught, Wylam MD†; Tonkin, Katia MD‡; Vallance, Jeffrey K. PhD*; Ladha, Aliya B. MSc*; Schepansky, Alexandra MD†; Capstick, Valerie MD†; Courneya, Kerry S. PhD*, looked at ‘Physical Activity in Ovarian Cancer Survivors: Associations With Fatigue, Sleep, and Psychosocial Functioning’, International Journal of Gynecological Cancer 19/1 (2009): 73-78 and found out that ‘Ovarian cancer survivors who were meeting physical activity guidelines reported more favorable outcomes of fatigue, peripheral neuropathy, sleep, and psychosocial functioning.’

Already before a similar team, Clare Stevinson et al., ‘Associations between physical activity and quality of life in ovarian cancer survivors’, Gynecologic Oncology 106/1 (2007): 244–50, to find out that ‘few ovarian cancer survivors are meeting public health physical activity guidelines, but those that are meeting guidelines report significantly and meaningfully better quality of life. Clinical trials investigating the causal effects of physical activity on quality of life in ovarian cancer survivors are warranted’.

Monday, 9 March 2015

Marcion and the canonical redaction and edition of the New Testament

Having attended the recent conference on 'The New Testament and its Text in the 2nd Century'
(Dresden 5.–7. März 2015), for the first time, I have understood the importance and impact of the so-called canonical redaction and edition of the New Testament (suggested first by David Trobisch a few years ago, and picked up by Matthias Klinghardt). Until now, I have largely overlooked this potentially extremely important piece in the jigsaw of the development of the canon, simply because it did not jump to my eyes from the sources. However, as so often, one does not catch indications, if one does not know what to look for. So, over the next weeks, I will particularly look out for what the sources tell us about this edition. That the NT did not flow somehow out of communities into what more or less without conscious, editorial direction ended up to be a collection, has always been my suspicion. Now, however, I have become more convinced that the first conscious collection of a gospel and the 10 Pauline letters by Marcion, together with his preface, the Antitheses, was followed by that other today called canonical redaction and edition of the NT, presumably done sometime during the 160s.

For a while I was puzzled that scholars today assumed that Marcion had not written much, if anything (except his preface, the Antitheses, and a letter) at all. And yet, the fathers unanimously talk about his writings in the plural. Irenaeus calls up 'scriptis' of Marcion (I 27), Epiphanius speaks about syntagmata of him, Ephrem knows of works of Marcion, and the anonymous Syriac author gives us even a quote of the opening of his 'Pro-Gospel' (Harnack correctly attributing this text to Marcion's Antitheses). Hence, if Marcion had not written anything at all, or only a preface and a letter, the fathers would be misled and inform us incorrectly. Hence, I think, when Tertullian calls Marcion the evangelizator or Gospel-writer, together with his preface and his letter, this fits the evidence better.

More important even is with regards the question of the NT collection above that Marcion in his Antitheses not only criticised the Gospel of Luke (Tertullian never speaks of Marcion using another protogospel), but, as Tertullian reports, with reference to Galatians also 'on this ground Marcion strives hard to overthrow the credit of those gospels which are the apostles' own and are published under their names, or even the names of apostolic men, with the intention no doubt of conferring on his own gospel the repute which he takes away from those others. ' (Tert., Adv. Marc. IV 3,2; Trans. Evans)
Without doubt, Tertullian reckons Marcion's Gospel to be his own as much as the others are owned by first the apostles (obviously Matthew and John) and 'the apostolic men' (Mark and Luke). Hence, according to Tertullian, Marcion knew of these four gospels when he criticised those in his work and accused them of being copies of his own. This also means that the four gospels existed at the time when Marcion published his own New Testament with his preface (= Antitheses), his gospel and his collection of 10 Pauline Letters. What he did not know, however (contrary to Harnack, 79), was a collection of those four gospels. Quite the opposite seems to be the case, and it seems that Marcion himself grouped these four texts, as they may either have been the earliest copies of his own, or from the copies that have been made, these four sounded the most closely resembling his own gospel-text, hence, there was need for Marcion to mention these Gospels with their presumed authors and to discredit these.
This, then, gives as the very first and only existing early evidence, why precisely those four gospels were ever brought together. And it seems to me that only in reaction to Marcion's discrediting of the four, exactly those four and no others were then defended by later authors like Irenaeus. Prior to Irenaeus, however, a full editorial enterprise had started. Justin or Justin's pupil Tatian have started to edit these four texts into what became known as Diatessaron, Theophilus of Antioch seems to have created his own Gospel-harmony, and, if David Trobisch is correct, the Carpos, mentioned in 2Tim. 4:13 (= Polycarpos of Smyrna, see D. Trobisch, 'Who published the New Testament', Free Inquiry  28 [2007/8] 30-3) seems to have built on Marcion's 'New Testament', but brought many more of the 27 writings into this same collection which, therefore, bore the same title, but gave credit to more than just one Gospel and 10 Pauline letters, and also was linked to what Marcion called (and rejected as) 'Old Testament'.
Here also a short version for the German Readers:
Ich habe zum erstenmal die Tragweite der Bedeutung der kanonischen Redaktion begriffen, die mir bislang aus den Texten so nicht entgegengeleuchtet hat. Doch in sie werde ich mich jetzt hinein vertiefen. Das einzige, was mich erstaunt, ist die Tatsache, dass die Redaktion als solche in keiner uns erhaltenen Quelle einen Niedergeschlag gefunden haben soll. Doch muss ich mich danach jetzt einmal erst auf die Suche machen, denn oft liest man Dinge nicht, von denen man vorher nicht recht gewusst hat.

In dieser Hinsicht auch nur eine kleine Lesefrucht zur frueheren Frage der Verfasserschaft Markions. Mir war immer schon aufgefallen, dass im Gegensatz zur modernen Forschung die Vaeter immer von einer Mehrzahl von Werken ausgegangen sind, die Markion selbst verfasst hatte. Irenaeus nennte 'scriptis' des Markion (I 27), Epiphanius spricht von syntagmata Markions, auch Ephraem nennt Schriften Markions und der von mir zitierte anonyme syrische Autor, der sogar den Eroeffnungspassus zitiert, ordnet diesen dem 'Proevangelium' zu, ein Text, der von Harnack wohl zurecht der Eroeffnung der Antithesen zugeordnet wird. Wenn Markion nichts anderes als die Antithesen als Vorwort einer Sammlung fremder Texte (und einen Brief) geschrieben haette, waeren die Angaben der Vaeter allesamt unverstaendlich bzw. falsch. Gerade nach unserer Tagung ist es mir jedenfalls noch viel plausibler, dass es gar kein anderes 'Proevangelium' gegeben hat als dasjenige, das die Antithesen einleiten, naemlich das des Markion, das dann als Proevangelium fuer die anderen Evangelien diente.
Bei der gesamten Tagung haben alle Anwesenden nur vom Evangelium des zweiten Jahrhunderts gesprochen, wo im ersten Jahrhundert haette denn ein solcher Text ueberhaupt seinen Platz. Eine Rolle spielt er jedenfalls nicht. Anders die Paulusbriefe (wenn auch in der Vorform, wie sie noch Markion vorlagen).
Und zur Frage, was dem Markion vorlag. In den Antithesen (so auch Harnack) kritisiert Markion nicht nur das Lukasevangelium (von einem aelteren Evangelium ist bei Tertullian nie die Rede), sondern mit Bezug auf den Galaterbrief (in den Antithesen?) heisst es: 'Hierauf stützt er sich, um die Stellung der Evangelien zu erschüttern, die recht eigentlich solche sind und unter dem Namen der Apostel oder auch apostolischer Männer ausgegeben wurden, und so die Glaubwürdigkeit, die er ihnen genommen, seinem Evangelium zuzuwenden.' (Uebers. BKV).
Demnach haben, wie Harnack richtig gesehen, Markion bei seiner Publikationsversion Matth., Joh., Markus und Lukas vorgelegen. Nicht richtig aber ist Harnack, wenn er hierin bereits eine 'autoritative Sammlung' dieser Schriften sah. M.E. hat erst Markion durch seine Kritik gerade an diesen, seiner Schrift am naechsten gekommenen Plagiate die Grundlage gelegt, auf der dann zur Verteidigung gerade dieser vier von ihm inkriminierten Schriften die Sammlung des NT angelegt und mit all den anderen Schriften abgesichert wurde. Die Tatsache der Inkriminierung der vier Evangelien durch Markion ist m.E. die erste und einzige bisher greifbare auessere Begruendung fuer die Zusammenstellung gerade dieser 4 Texte.

Thursday, 19 February 2015

Liber XXIV philosophorum - Book of 24 Philosophers, Latin - English


As there seems to be no English translation available for this important philosophical text, here my work in progress. The Latin text follows the latest critical edition Liber Viginti Quattuor Philosophorum, cura et studio Francoise Hudry, Hermes latinus III,1, CChr.CM CXLIIIA (Turnhout, 1997), taking into account the textcritical suggestions made by Kurt Flasch, Kurt Flasch, Was ist Gott? Das Buch der 24 Philosophen, Lateinisch-Deutsch (Munich, 2011); and also F. Hudry, Le livre des vingt-quatre philosophes, Histoire des doctrines de l'antiquite classique 39 (Paris, 2009) (the oldest version in ms. Laon, 412, ff. 92v-93v = L). Contrary to Hudry, however, I do neither think, the text is by Marius Victorinus - I think, the definitions and the commentary derive from two different sources -, nor do I believe that the Laon manuscript preserves an older version, yet a version that is sometimes better, sometimes more corrupt than the younger manuscripts. In order to let the reader see and decide, here the text with my own translation: 
 

Liber viginti quattor philosophorum
Book of 24 Philosophers
 
< PROLOGUS>
Congregatis viginti quattuor philosophis, solum eis in quaestione remansit: quid est Deus? Qui communi consilio datis indutiis (L: iudiciis) et tempore iterum conveniendi statuto, singuli de Deo proprias proponerent propositiones (L: interpretationes)  sub definitione, ut ex propriis definitionibus excerptum (L om.) certum aliquid (L: id) de Deo communi assensu statuerent.
(L add.: quorum unus sic proposuit)
< Preface >
While the 24 Philosophers were brought together, amongst them the only question remained: Who is God? Having decided jointly deliberated, after a break (L: after judgements were passed), to fix again another time to come together again, they should individually in form of a definition propose their understanding (L: interpretations) of God, in order to state, taken from the various definitions, something assured and jointly agreed about God. (L: Of these, one made the following suggestion)
I

DEUS EST MONAS (L: MONOS) MONADEM GIGNENS IN (L: EX) SE UNUM REFLECTENS ARDOREM.
Haec definitio data est secundum imaginationem primae causae, prout se numerose multiplicat in se, ut sit (L: fuerit) multiplicans acceptus sub unitate, multiplicatus sub binario, reflexus sub ternario. Sic quidem (L add. etiam) est in numeris (L: multis): unaquaeque unitas proprium habet numerum, quia super diuersum ab aliis reflectitur.
I
 
GOD IS A MONADE (L: THE SOLE) THAT BRINGS FORTH A MONADE BY REFLECTING IN (L: OUTSIDE) HIMSELF AS A FLAME.
 
This definition is given imagining the first cause, just as it numerously multiplies itself in itself, so that as multiplying it is (L: has been) taken as unity, as the multiplied as twofold, as reflex threefold. So it is, namely, (L: also) with numbers (L: the many): Each single unity has its own number, insofar as it reflects the diversity from the others.
II

DEUS EST SPHAERA INFINITA CUIUS CENTRUM EST UBIQUE, CIRCUMFERENTIA (L add.: VERO) NUSQUAM.
Haec definitio data est per modum imaginandi ut continuum (L: centrum) ipsam primam causam in vita sua. Terminus (L: Circulus) quidem suae extensionis est supra ubi et extra terminans. Propter hoc ubique est centrum eius, nullam habens in communia dimensionem. Cum quaerit circumferentiam suae sphaericitatis, elevatam in infinitum dicet, quia quicquid est sine dimensione sicut creatoris (L: creans) fuit (L add.: et) initium est et sic (L add.: eius) terminus nusquam. Sic patet propositum.
II
 
GOD IS AN INFINITE SPHERE WHOSE

CENTRE IS EVERYWHERE AND HIS CIRCUMFERENCE (L: INDEED) NOWHERE
 
This definition is given as a way of imagining that the continuum (L: centre) is the very first cause in its own life. Namely the end (L: circle) of its extension lies above the ‘where’, terminating outside. Therefore, its centre is everywhere, and has no common dimension. Asked for the circumference of its sphere, he states that it is elevated into infinity, as what is without dimension, was like the creator, is (L: also) the beginning and so (L: its) the end is nowhere. From which the proposition is clear.
III
DEUS EST TOTUS IN QUOLIBET SUI.

Haec definitio data est secundum considerationem essentiae divinitatis in sua simplicitate. Cum non sit aliquid ipsi resistens, ipsa simul ubique tota (L: data) ens, et etiam similiter super et extra ubique non distrahitur defectu virtutis alicuius in ipsa deficientis, nec stat terminata (L: etiam aliter sic) virtute alieni dominantis.
III
 
GOD IS TOTALLY IN WHATEVER BELONGS TO HIM.
 
This definition is given in consideration of the essence of the Godhead in its simplicity. As nothing else should exist to resists it, it is itself once and everywhere total (L: given) being, and similarly above and outside the ‘where’, and it is neither drawn awy by any defect of virtue which would be a defect in itself, nor is it limited (L: also such other) by virtue of a dominating alien.
IV
DEUS EST MENS ORATIONEM (L: RATIONEM) GENERANS, CONTINUATIONEM PERSEVERANS.

Haec definitio dicit vitam propriam secundum rationes diversas ipsius essentiae deitatis. Numerat enim se genitor gignendo; genitura vero verbificat (L: verificat) se quia gignitur; adaequatur vero per modum continuationis <qui> se habet spirando (<qui> se habet spirando] L: et sic est perseverans].
IV
GOD IS INTELLECT THAT GENERATES THE WORD (L: INTELLECT), PRESERVING CONTINUATION.

This definition expresses life proper of the essence of the Godhead itself with regards to diverse aspects. Namely it mentions that what generates, generates itself; yet, what is generated speaks itself out as word (L: verifies itself), because it is generated; but it is adequated by way of continuation, which preserves itself as spiration.

(L: and so remains).
V

DEUS EST QUO NIHIL MELIUS
EXCOGITARI POTEST.

 
Haec definitio data est a fine. Unitas vero finis est et perfectio. Quod ergo sonat hoc, bonum est (L om.), et quanto magis, tanto magis bonum. Gaudium ergo veritatis omnis essentiae sua vita est, vita quidem omnis ab unitate, haec (L: hoc) autem ab interiori (L: inferiori) indivisione. Quanto igitur magis unum (L: imum), tanto magis vivit. Sua unitas summa est. (L add.: et sic patet propositum)
V


GOD IS THE ONE BEYOND WHOM NOTHING BETTER CAN BE THOUGHT OF.

This definition is given with regards the end. Namely the oneness of the end is also perfection. What, therefore, sounds accordingly, is good, and what sounds more so, is so much better. Joy, therefore, of all true essence is its life, all life derives from oneness, this, however, from being undivided within (L: below). The more, therefore, something is one (L: below), the more it is alife. Its oneness is the utmost one. (L: And so the proposition is evident.)
VI

DEUS EST CUIUS COMPARATIONE SUBSTANTIA EST ACCIDENS, ET ACCIDENS NIHIL
.


Haec definitio datur (L: data est) sub relatione. Subiectum quoque accidentis propria substantia est cum aliena. Quae aliena si recedit, perit accidens, id est proprietas agens. Relatione ergo ad primum agens (L: causam) omnis substantia accidens est, et accidens nihil, et substat nihil substantiae ut alienum (L: accidens ut et substantia nihil). Substantia divina est ut substantia propria quae non fluit. (L: Et est aliena autem substantia divina, ut est propria substantia quae non fluit)
VI

GOD IS THE ONE COMPARED TO WHOM ANY SUBSTANCE IS AN ACCIDENS, AND ANY ACCIDENS IS NOTHING.

This definition is given with regards to relation. The subject, too, of an accidens is its proper substance, although an alien one. If the alien recedes, the accidens perishes, namely its acting propriety. In relation, therefore, to the first actor (L: cause), all substance is accidens, and any accidens is nothing, and it is not anything of substance, but what is alien. Only the divine substance is a proper substance which is not flowing. (L: The divine substance, however, is also alien, as it is a proper substance that is not flowing).
VII

DEUS EST PRINCIPIUM (L: PRIMUM) SINE PRINCIPIO (L: PRIMATU), PROCESSUS SINE VARIATIONE, FINIS SINE FINE.
 


Haec definitio est secundum speciem data (L: data est secundum speciem <centri>). Genitor vero primum capit ratione geniturae, sed non sic (L: om.) primo ut non prius. Genitus vero procedit generatione in finem, sed non recipit variationem natura (natura] L: ut) medii. Intendit enim quod idem est finis vero nomine generantis et geniti, quia non est vita divina nisi unum medio (L: medium) tantum; sed non est finis (L: om.) ratione operis (L: operationis), ut quies et (L: om.) motus.
VII

GOD IS THE PRINCIPLE (L: FIRST) WITHOUT PRINCIPLE (L: PRINCIPALITY), THE PROCESS WITHOUT VARIATION, THE END WITHOUT END.

This definition is given with regard to the specific nature [of the divine] (L: with regard to the species of the centre). What generates gets indeed ‘first’ with regards to what it generates, but thus (L: m.) not first, as if he were not before. What is being generated comes forth by generation towards its end, but being of a medium (being of a medium] L: as) nature does not suffer variation. Therefore this means that the end of what is truly called generator and generated, is the same, as it would not be divine life, unless such one middle one; yet, it is not end  (L: om.) in the sense of acting, such as rest with regards also (L: om.) to motion.
VIII

DEUS EST AMOR QUI PLUS HABITUS MAGIS LATET.

Haec definitio data (L: om.) est per effectum. In prima causa id a quo vita et est ipsum a (est ipsum] L: sperma) quo vita tota. Igitur id ipsum est fons (L add.: fons) amoris in illo. Quod si rei creatae unitas (unitas] L: illius) generantis et geniti ad illam penitus se inclinat, revertendo per viam regressionis, tunc est id ipsum amor creaturae, prout ordinata est creatura ab ipso (L: ipso] L: ipsa) cui quanto magis te unificaveris (L: vivificaveris), tanto exaltaberis et tanto elevabitur. Et hoc eius latere est.
VIII

GOD IS LOVE WHO THE MORE HE IS HELD THE MORE HE HIDES.
 
This definition is related (L: om.) to the effect. In the first cause that from which life stems is also the one itself (stems is also the one itself] L: also the semen stems) from which all life stems. Therefore this itself is the well (L add.: the well) of love in that one. If in the created thing the oneness (the oneness] L: that) of what generates and is generated inclines itself most inwardly towardes that one, reverting by way of regression, then this is itself the love of the creature to which creature has been ordained by him (L: it) , and the more you unify (L: live) yourself with him (L: it), the more you will be exalted and the more he will be elevated. And this is how he himself hides.
IX

DEUS EST CUI (L: om.) SOLI PRAESENS EST QUICQUID CUIUS TEMPORIS EST.

Haec definitio est secundum formam. Totum quidem uno aspectu omnes partes videt, pars vero totum non videt, nisi diversis respectibus et successivis. Propter hoc deitas est (L: om.) successivorum totalitas. Unde intuitus eius unicus est, (L add.: et) non consequenter factus.
IX  

GOD IS THE ONE TO WHOM (L: om.) ALONE IS PRESENT WHAT BELONGS TO TIME.

This definition relates to form. The totality namely sees the parts in one look, whereas the part does not see the totality, unless from diverse perspectives and succesively. Therefore, the Godhead is the totality of successive things. Wherefore its intuition is unique and not the result of a process.
X

DEUS EST CUIUS POSSE NON NUMERATUR, CUIUS ESSE NON CLAUDITUR, CUIUS BONITAS NON TERMINATUR.

Haec definitio patet per quartam et septimam. In posse creato (caro] L: et caro), et primo inventus est numerus, secundum plura aut pauciora opera educentia possibile ad actum (L: accidentia), quia, si sint infinita, impossibile dicitur. Eius enim (L: om.) quod fiet (L: fuit) ab eo actu sunt infinita opera; unde (L: om.) subito operatur. Ubi vero (vero] L: enim) est infinitus numerus ordinatus ad actum et invenitur (L: vincitur) resistens, non poterit evenire (L: enuntiari). Omne esse clausionem dicit finitatis alicuius. Unde a centro ad esse (L add.: et esse)eius sunt operationes finitae (L: futurae). In divino esse non est sic (L: non sic autem est in divino esse), sed opera infinita a centro ad extimum (a centro ad extimum] L: ad ostium) et actum. Unde sua clausio infinita est et actu non impossibilis (L: possibilis), nisi quia necesse (L: necessario) existens. Unde sequitur quod etiam redeundo est i(L: om.) nterminata bonitas via securior ab esse in unitatem (L: unione) centri.
X

GOD IS THE ONE WHOSE POWER IS NOT COUNTED, WHOSE BEING NOT CLOSED, WHOSE GOODNESS NOT LIMITED.
 
This definition is clear from the fourth and seventh [definition]. In the created (L: om.) power also the number is first found (also ... found] L: the number is both central and first found), where according to more or fewer actions bring the possible things to realised ones, (L: accidents) because, were they infinite, it would be said to be impossible. Namely (L: om.) the one from which things have been acted upon, this has limitless actions, with the result (L: om.) that it acts suddenly. Where, however, infinite number of planned actions are and where it finds (L: overcomes)  resistance, it cannot succeed (L: state). All being is called closure of something’s finitude. Wherefore from the centre to (L add.: being and) its being there are only finite (L: future) actions. In the Godhead, however (L: om.), being is not alike, but infinite actions from the centre to the extreme (from the centre to the extreme esit] L: are outside and acted upon). Therefore, its closure is infinite and action not impossible (L: possible), if not even necessary. It follows therefore that also in returning, endless goodness is the way which is the more secure from being into the unity of the centre.
XI

DEUS EST SUPER ENS, NECESSE, SOLUS SIBI ABUNDANTER, SUFFICIENTER
.

Haec definitio formalis est, sed (sed] L: et etiam a quo materia) relata. Esse omne clausionem dicit. Superest igitur qui non clauditur. Et (L: Est) necesse quia malum non habet, quia non clauditur, sed infinita possibilitate. Nec sic distrahitur suum superesse (L: et esse) quin (L: cum) redeat a (L: om.) se in se, et non totum indigenter, sed exuberanter (L: exabundanter).
XI
 
GOD IS ABOVE BEING, NECESSITY, HE ALONE IS HIMSELF MORE ABUNDANT AND MORE SUFFICIENT.
 
This is a formal, but relational definition (formal, but relational definition] L: formal definition and also one from which matter is related). Being is said to be totally closed. Therefore, what is above being is not closed. And (L: om.) it is necessary, because it misses nothing, as it is not closed, but of infinite possibility. Thus neither it is drawn away, being itself above (L: and) being, as it never moves away from itself, but returns to itself, and isn not in need of the totality, but in excess of it.
XII

DEUS EST CUIUS VOLUNTAS DEIFICAE ET POTENTIAE ET SAPIENTIAE ADAEQUATUR.

Voluntas, scire et posse principia (L: prius) sunt actionis in creaturis. Non aequalia sunt quia voluntas est deiformior quam scire et posse. Mihi (L: ut) quidem natura coartavit posse, correptio vero scire, sed (L: si) remanet voluntas non coacta usque ad elongationem (L: clangationem) perpetuam.
XII

GOD IS THE ONE WHOSE WILL EQUATES TO HIS GODMAKING POWER AND WISDOM.

Will, knowledge and power are principles (L: prior) of action in creatures. They are not equal because will es more conforming to God compared to knowledge and power. Indeed, nature has confined power to me (L: om.), practicing, indeed, knowledge, but will remains unrestrained for perpetual elongation (L: resonance).
XIII
DEUS EST SEMPITERNITAS AGENS IN SE, SINE DIVISIONE ET HABITU.

Agunt creata et acquirunt habitum. Agunt et deficiunt continuatione quia inveniunt resistens. Unde fatigatio scindit vim. Sic non est in creatore. Non (L add. tamen)  transmutatur (L add. in) acquirendo habitum. Non (non] L: ut) indiget obumbratione ut quiescat fatigatus.
XIII
GOD IS ETERNITY ACTING IN HIMSELF WITHOUT DIVISION AND DISPOSITION
 
The creatures act and acquire a disposition. The act without continuity as they hit resistance. As a result, fatigue cuts down her strength. So it is not in the Creator. He is not (L add. then) transformed by aquiring a disposition. He does not (he does not] L: so that he does) overshade so that he gets tired and rests.
XIV

DEUS EST OPPOSITIO (L: OPPOSITA) NIHIL (L: UT) MEDIATIONE (L: MEDITATIO) ENTIS.

Haec definitio imaginari facit Deum esse sphaeram in cuius centro nihil (L: ut)   incarceratur. Et est continue agens sphaera divina opus divinum quo detinet (L add.: ut) nihil in suo esse aeternaliter, a quo per exuberantiam suae bonitatis vocavit in esse rem quae (rem quae est] L: cum inest) quasi circa centrum. Quae (L: aut) si ad esse actum attrahit (L: attrahitur), stabit sphaera, si ad esse possibile, redibit ad nihilum.
XIV

GOD IS THE OPPOSITION TO NOTHINGNESS (L: OPPOSITES) BY MEDIATION OF BEING.
 
This definition creates the image of God being a sphere, in the centre of which nothing (L: he) is emprisoned. And the divine sphere is continuously acting the divine work through which it detains eternally nothing to be in it, from which through exuberance of its goodness it calls into being the thing which is as if it (the thing which is as if it] L: As he) existed around the centre. If (L: Either) it attracts it (L: is attracted) to being, the sphere remains, if to potential being, it goes back to nothing.
XV

DEUS EST VITA CUIUS VIA IN FORMAM EST VERITAS (L: UNITAS), IN UNITATEM BONITAS.

Est motus a medio et ad medium: primus (L: prius) dat esse, secundus (L: secundo) dat vivere. In Deo primus (L: prius) motus (L: magnus) est via generantis ad genitum cum esse; secundus (L: secundo), id est via conversa, est bonitas.
XV
 
GOD IS LIFE WHOS WAY TOWARDS FORM IS TRUTH (L: UNITY), TOWARDS UNITY IS GOODNESS.

There is motion from the middle and towards the middle: the first (the first] L: he first) gives to be, the second (the second] L: second, he) gives to live. In God, the first (the first] L; first) motion (L: greatness) is through generating towards the generated to be, the second (the second] L: second) which is the converse way, is goodness.
XVI

DEUS EST QUOD SOLUM VOCES (L: VOCIS) NON SIGNIFICANT (L: SIGNIFICAT) PROPTER EXCELLENTIAM, NEC (L: UT) MENTES (L add.: NON) INTELLIGUNT PROPTER DISSIMILITUDINEM.


Officium vocis est significare intellectus mentis, et non aliud. Anima non invenit in se speciem vel (L: vel) exemplar Dei, quia ipsa sunt penitus ipse, non secundum quod sit in rebus. Ergo dissimilis est ei secundum se totum, et non intellectus (L: intellectum), igitur nec significatus (L: significatum).
XVI
 
GOD IS THE ONE WHOSE NAMES (L: NAME ALONE DO (L: DOES) NEITHER SIGNIFY [HIM] BECAUSE OF [HIS] EXCELLENCE, NOR DO INTELLECTS GRASP [HIM] BECAUSE OF [HIS] DISSIMILITUDE.

The task of a name is to signify intellectual concepts, nothing else. The soul does not invent in itself the form or sample of God, because they themselves are innermost himself, not in the way he is in the things. Therefore as he is, he is totally dissimilar to them, also neither intellectually grasped (L: is he intellect), nor, therefore signified.
XVII

DEUS EST INTELLECTUS SUI SOLUM, PRAEDICATIONEM (L: PRAEDICATIONIS) NON RECIPIENS.

Non cognoscitur nodus per relationem nodi. Praedicatio (praedicatio] L: sed ideo) in rebus est (L: om.) ut diversis rationibus explicetur quod unica includitur. Igitur cum in Deo non sint diversae (L: om.) rationes secundum prius et posterius, perficientes quid eius secundum magis et minus, non recipit praedicationem, sed se ipsum ipse (L: specie)  intelligit quia ipsum ad ipsum generat.
XVII
 
GOD IS INTELLECT FOR HIM ALONE, HE DOES NOT RECEIVE A PREDICATION.

A knot is not regocnised through a relation to a knot. With Predication (with predication] L: but, therefore) in things diverse aspects are unfold what is included in one single. Therefore, as there are not diverse (L: om.) aspects in God, such as prior and later, which would perfect him more or less, he does not receive predication, but he knows himself through himself (L: species), because he himself generates himself.
XVIII

DEUS EST SPHAERA CUIUS TOT SUNT CIRCUMFERENTIAE QUOT PUNCTA.


Ista sequitur ex secunda, quia cum sit totus sine dimensione, et etiam dimensionis infinitae, non erit in sphaera suae essentiae extremum (L: extentio). Igitur (L: Ergo)  non est in extremo punctus (in extremo punctus] L: punctum) quin exterius sit (L add.: circuli) circumferentia.
XVIII
 
GOD IS A SPHERE WHICH HAS AS MANY CIRCUMFERENCES AS CENTREPOINTS.

This [definition] follows from the second, because with him being totally without dimension, even without infinite dimension, the extreme (L: extenstion) did not exist in the sphere of his essence. Therefore there is no centrepoint in the extreme (no centrepoint in the extreme] L: point), unless the circumference (L add. of the circle) would be even further exterior.
XIX

DEUS EST SEMPER MOVENS IMMOBILIS.

(L add.: Haec definitio sic manifestatur:)

Immobilis dicitur Deus quia est secundum unam dispositionem semper, et hoc est esse (L: cum) in quiete. Movens semper est, quia vivens in se, tamen sine (tamen sine] L: sine etiam) alteratione. Intelligit se intellectu simplici, et hoc est quod intellectus perficit intellectum, et intellectum est forma intelligentis.
XIX
 
GOD THE UNMOVED ALWAYS MOVES.
 
(L add.: This definition becomes clear from what follows:)
God is said to be unmoved, because he always is of the one disposition, and this is to be resting. He is always moving, because he is alive in itself, however without alteration. He knows himself according to simple knowledge, so that knowledge perfects what is known and what is known is the form of knowledge.
XX

DEUS EST QUI SOLUS SUI INTELLECTU VIVIT.

Non vivit sicut corpora quae recipiunt aliena intra se ut (L: ideo) convertant ea in sui naturam. Non vivit ut (L: sicut) corpora supracaelestia quae a spiritibus habent motum, nec vivit (nec vivit] L om.) ut intelligentiae (L add.: non), animae (L: om.) quae ab ipsius unitate sustentantur. Sed (L: om.) a se ipso (L add.: vivit) et in se (L add.: ipsum) intelligendo vivit et est superessentialiter.
XX
 
GOD IS THE ONLY ONE WHO LIVES THROUGH HIS KNOWLEDGE.
 
He does not live like bodies that receive alien things in themselves, so that they convert them into their own nature. He does not live (He does not live] L: not) like supracelestial bodies which have motion from the spirits, nor does he live like minds, souls (L: om.), who from unity with himself are sustained. Instead (L: om.), he lives through knowing of himself and (L add. lives himself) in himself, therefore is above being.
XXI

DEUS EST TENEBRA IN ANIMA POST OMNEM LUCEM RELICTA.

Species rerum (L add.: quae) apud animam, quae detegunt quod in ipsa est
, gratia cuius dicitur (dicitur] L: deus) quodammodo omnia (omnia] L: est anima), ipse illuminat animam (L: animae). Sed post abiectionem omnium (L: communium) istarum formarum contemplatur divinitatem. Abnegando et removendo (L add. removendo) omnes rerum species ab ipsa, convertit se  (L add.: ad) supra se et vult videre causam primam. Et obtenebratur intellectus animae, quia non est aptus ad illam lucem increatam. Unde cum ad se convertit, dicit: Hic mihi tenebrae sunt (Unde ... sunt] L: om.).
XXI

GOD IS DARKNESS LEFT BEHIND IN THE SOUL AFTER ALL LIGHT.
 
The forms of things (L: which are) at the soul which reveal what is in her, because of that it is said of her (that is said of her] L: God) that she is somehow all, (somehow all] L: the soul), itself illuminates the soul (L: something of the soul). But after the detachment of all those (all those] L: the communion of) forms, the divinity is contemplated. Through abnegation and removal (. Through abnegation and removal] L: , through abnegation and removal. The removal) of all forms of things von herself, she turns herself beyond herself and wants to see the first cause. And the intellect of the soul is overshadowed, because it is not apt for that uncreated light. Therefore, when it turns towards itself, it says: This is darkness for me (Therefore ... me] L: om.).
XXII

DEUS EST EX QUO EST QUICQUID EST NON PARTITIONE, PER QUEM EST NON VARIATIONE, IN QUO EST QUOD EST NON COMMIXTIONE.


Applicatione (L: Ad applicationem) vero suae triformis essentiae ad nihil, iuxta (L: iusta) illas res quae sunt ad esse producit, ut ex generante (ut ex generante] L: ut est ex generato generator suum) initium suae existentiae (L: essentiae)perciperent, per genitum in esse starent, in vivificatore (L: uniformitate) permanerent. Sed sic ex generante – quod (L: om.) ipse non dividitur – aliquid de sua essentia eis adhaerentiam tribueret, nec (L: ne) species divina, rebus speciem dans per se, non per alium, se ipsam (L: ipsum) variaret, nec vivificator (L: unitor), ipsa in se colligens, commixtionem ex interceptione (L: interpretatione) aut impuritatem contraheret (L: attraheret).
XXII
 
GOD IS THE ONE OUT OF WHOM IS W WITHOUT HIM BEING PARTITIONED, THROUGH WHOM IS WITHOUT HIM BEING ALTERED, IN WHOM IS WITHOUT HIM BEING MIXED WITH IT.

By applying his threefold essence indeed to nothingness, he brings those things for to be which are, so that they gain the beginning of their existence through generation (L: so that out of the generated there is a generator, and they perceive the beginning of their being), exist through being generated, being kept alife (kept alife] L: in unity) they remain. However, thus they are from being generated that he himself is undivided, and does not donate something of his own being which would adhere to them, neither the divine form, but the form for things, given through himself, not through another, without altering himself, neither as if the life giver (life giver] L: unifyer), by collecting (L: attracting) them in himself, suffers mixture from interception or impurity.
XXIII

DEUS EST QUI SOLA IGNORANTIA MENTE COGNOSCITUR.


Haec definitio cognoscitur per vicesimam primam. (L add.: secundum) nihil cognoscitur ab anima nisi cuius speciem (L add.: secundum habitum) recipere potest et ad exemplar eius quod est in ipsa comparare. Nullius (L: Vi illius) enim habet (L add.: species cum) anima exemplar nisi illius quod per ipsam (nisi illius quod per ispam] L: quod in ipsa) a prima causa fluxit in esse. Igitur eius quod (L: qui) est super ipsam non habebit cognitionem, igitur non primae causae. Sed cum omnem aliorum contemplata fuerit scientiam (fuerit scientiam] L: et animam ipsam), extrahendo ipsam (L: om.) primam causam a rebus et supponendo oppositionem (L add.: et) nihil, quantum poterit acquirere sic habebit cognitionem. Et hoc est vere (vere] L: ut) ignorare, scilicet scire quid non est, et nesciendo quid est.
XXIII
 
GOD IS THE ONE WHO THROUGH IGNORANCE OF THE MIND ALONE IS BEING GRASPED.
 
This definition is known through the twentyfirst [definition]. (L: Accordingly) Nothing is known by the soul, unless she can receive the form of him (L: according to habit) and compare it to the sample of him that is in her. Yet, the soul has no sample whatsoever (Yet, the soul has no sample whatsoever] L: Yet, through the power of him, the soul has the form with the soul as sample) except those that through herself (L: which through herself) flew from the first cause into being. Therefore, she has no knowledge of what  (L: who)is above her, hence, not of the first cause. Now, once she has contemplated all knowable (knowable] L: and the soul itself) of others, and by extracting the first cause itself (L: om.) from the things and by understanding the opposition to (L: and) nothingness, as far as she can aquire it, so she will gain cognition. And this is true ignorance, namely to know what she is not, and not to know what she is.
XXIV

DEUS EST LUX QUAE FRACTIONE NON CLARESCIT, TRANSIT, SED SOLA DEIFORMITAS IN RE (L: om. definitio).


Haec definitio est ad essentiam data. Lux creata sicut (L add.: cum) cadit super rem tenebrosam (L add.: ita quod fit) tantae tenebrositatis (L add.: ita) quod non sit potens lux illa purgare tenebrosum, propter sui vehementem possibilitatem (L: densitatem), tunc frangitur lux in radiis (L add.: et sic cum sic), in maximo (L: maxime) scilicet sui acuti, et (scilicet sui acuti et] L: se multiplicantibus), pertransit in accidentia, essentialis cum ista fractio accidentia multiplicat (in accidentia ... multiplicat] L: illud densum medium, contrari<e> infinitum in se in ipsis creaturis respectu lucis divinae). Et haec claritas est. Lux divina non invenit in rebus creatis tantam possibilitatem quae eam frangat in sui actione; unde omnia pertransit (Et haec ... pertransit] L: Cum enim non sit tanta possibilitas in creaturis, non in rebus creatis, quae frangat lucem diviniam in sui actione, immo animam pertransit). Sed sola deiformitas in re, illa multiplicat et claritatem in re generat, in se nullam. Et hoc est quod dicit (sola  ...  dicit] L: cum sit in re aliqua deformitas, scilicet respectu sui creatoris, tunc in illa claritatem aliquam generat, in se vero nullam. Et sic ab intelligentia creata 'sola ignorantia' etc. Haec per Dei gratiam expleta sufficiant.
XXIV
 
GOD IS LIGHT WHICH DOES NOT RADIATES AND SHINES THROUGH FRACTIONS, BUT THROUGH DEIFORMITY IN REALITY.
 
This definition refers to essence. Created light (L: as it) falls upon a dark thing  into(L: which fits) such darkness that such light might not be able to clear the darkness, because of its [the thing’s] strong power (L: density), then the light fractions in radiation (L: and so with it), mostly there where it is most intense (mostly ... intense] L: it extremely multiplies itself), and it goes over into accidens. As it is an essential fraction, the accidens multiply (into accidens ... multiply] L: to that dense medium, contrary to the infinity in itself in the creatures themselves with regard to divine light). And this is what shines. The divine light does not find in created things such possibility which fractions it in its action; therefore it goes through everything (And this ... everything] L: As there are no such possibilities in creatures or in created things which fraction the divine light in its action, it goes on the contrary through the soul). The deiformity alone in the thing multiplies and generates shining light in the thing, yet not in itself. That is what he says (the deiformity ... says] L: But as there is in the thing a deformation with respect to its creator, then it generates in it a sort of clarity, none however, in itself. Thus, there is 'pure ignorance' of the created intelligence etc. This, accomplished by the grace of God, may suffice).

 I'd also like to draw the attention of the reader to Peter Sloterdijk, Sphären (Frankfurt a.M., 1999), II 537-61, 537 who presents an interpretation of prop. I, II and XVIII of the Liber Viginti Quattuor Philosophorum. He reads these propositions as expressions of the metaphysical crisis within which our thinking sees God as the basis of everything, while the world is given no more value than a complexe fold in the innerst of the absolute, thus devaluing the concrete. I would be sceptical of this interpretation, especially in light of Sloterdijk's own reading of proposition XVIII (ibid. 539-40) according to which it is God’s property to transmit the gift of his fullness of being to every place, in order to make that place to its own fully divine centre. Perhaps my differing reading is due to the argument that would not call such a modell a chain-reaction, as this would entail a cause and effect relation.