New
Parisian Questions
Translated,
Introduced and Explicated
by
Markus
Vinzent
1. Does omnipotence
which is in God need to be considered as absolute power or as ordered power?
And it seems that it has [to be
considered] as ordered power, because it needs to be considered as that which
suits God to do and as that what He is able to do.
The counter-argument. Omnipotence refers
to all things that do not entail the contrary, these are even more than what is
ordered.
Here, it is shown first that there
is a power in God. For power is defined as being ordered towards action.
Action, however, is two-fold. On one hand, namely, is the form that corresponds
to passive power, and the activity which corresponds to the active power.
And the latter is in God; first, because,
while where there is intrinsic and extrinsic activity, there is power; in God the
activity is intrinsic and extrinsic [...]; on the other hand, because according
to Avicenna, power is first credited to human beings since they have the
strength to overcome; God, however, cannot be subjected to something else;
hence he is the very action.
But you ask: In which way is this power to be found in God?
The answer has to be: as that what is found in creatures, once the imperfection is removed <from them>, as ultimate perfection.
Again, I say that this power is really one, because it is said of all as one. Further, <divine>
essence is principle of all emanations, and itself is one. Therefore, asf.
Second, one has to enquire, in which way that distinction, namely, between absolute and directed power, has to be
understood.
If now things are attributed to God himself, such things belong to
absolute power.
If, however, things are attributed to himself with regards to intellect and wisdom, they then belong to directed power.
Similarly, thirdly, one has to answer this question that the Master in The Sentences determines, based on the authority of the Saints, and
he seems to say that they are both attributed <to God>.
Some, however, say that he is omnipotent from this that
he is able to do whatever he wills
out of himself and through himself.
The counter‑argument: This only explains the way in which power works. I, therefore, say, <God’s
power> rather has to be attributed as
absolute power according to <the fact> that it
can extend itself to all things, which do not imply contradiction, because it is taken with regards to what is possible.
Likewise, the power of God would otherwise be limited, if it were
attributed in a
specific way.
Similarly, as knowledge
is said of God who knows everything, because he knows everything, so also power. Why, however, does one not say that
he wills everything?
I answer: He only wills that to which
he applies his knowledge and/or power. And note that he is not called omnipotent because in him be the power for everything, but because he can do everything that is possible.
To this argument it
must be said that out of absolute power God can make what is not
decent now. If, nevertheless, these things were made, they would be decent and
just.
But you may
say: He cannot do except what he has foreseen. One has to reply that, if, of course, with
regards to 'unless', it refers to action, then this is true, because what he does, he has foreseen. But if it refers to power, then
it is wrong.
But you say: ‘Augustine says in the Enchiridion that he is omnipotent because “he can do whatever he wills”, not because he can do everything.’
One has to reply that Augustine spoke of 'wills', because in ‘everything’ evil is included that God 'cannot' do. Therefore, he speaks like
this.
2. Is the essence of God more
real than the property?
It seems that the essence (is more real), because it means infinite
reality.
The counter‑argument: Everything acts through realising. A Father, however, generates through fatherhood,
because through it <i.e.
fatherhood> he is constituted in his
being
<Father>. Likewise, the Father does
not make the Son alike in essence, because in number <according
to his essence>, he
is the same with the Son.
One has to admit that the question presupposes a real property and an
essence as well. Some, however, say that property is the power to generate,
1) first, because power and act are of the same genus, and
generating is
a relation;
2) next, because acting of a subject, taken per se, is
what it is, and the form through which it is, is that through which <it is>;
3) next, because the power to generate is notional, as it does not apply to everything;
4) next, because the Father does not communicate the power to generate
when he produces the Son;
5) next, because he does not generate, insofar as he is God, because in this way the Son would have generated,
therefore he generates insofar as <He is> Father.
The counter‑argument: Damascenus in his first book, chapter eight <writes>: 'Generating is the work of nature'. Therefore, nature is the
principle. Likewise, the noblest act derives from the noblest power. Likewise,
the likeness of the product lies in the essence. Therefore etc. It is not valid
to say that this is only true in the univocal generation, <but> not in an
identical one, because,
indeed, it is valid in univocal ones on account of the unity
of the form. This, however, is the greater unity, since it is a numerical unity. Likewise, the property cannot be the first term of the formal production,
according to the fifth book of the Physics, nor, therefore, the principle;
because also whiteness and
foundation are always understood as <being>
prior to the relation.
To the first of these, one has to say that the passive power and its
act are of the same genus, because the <passive> power does not have by itself that it could be
set by itself in a genus, but not the active power, which by itself can be
set in a genus.
To the second, one has to say, what acts sometimes acts through a common form; because in man the sensitive nature is the principle to remember, which would not be in an animal, …
… it is appropriated from the Father.
To the third, one has to say, that the power is essential and communal to the Trinity, be it to
elicit, if
connected with due respect.
<To the forth
…>
<To the fifth> that insofar as he is God, with due respect.
Others say, that the essence and the property are the potentiality; more principally, however, they say it is the property. Their reason: Whatever is in the generated, has something else that
responds in the generating. In the generated, however, are nature and relation.
Therefore etc. More principally, however, it conveys property; because the producer likens the product and sets a
distinction, and this he intends most. Therefore, the property is more principally.
The counter‑argument. They do not grasp the sense of the question,
because the question is not with regards to the total aggregate, but to that power by which generation occurs. Likewise, the conclusion is false. The
determination does not remove what has been signified, but restricts it to the
kind of mode in
which it is received. The power,
however, means the absolute, therefore, to generate does not take away the
signified, but only restricts it etc.
Likewise, the power to generate is neither a composite construct, nor one that is intransitive.
About the reason: The principle of generation is that which generates,
and thus it
is truly argued; but the question relates to the principle
that makes the generation to occur.
To the second one has to say that with regards to the end of the
generation, rather
a distinction is intended, but the intention of the
one who acts is primarily to communicate nature.
Others say that the power to generate is formally and intrinsically the
essence; that is what I hold. Therefore, Damascenus, in the first book, chapter
eight: 'the natural germination is the one according to substance etc.' And the
master <Peter Lombard> in the first book, seventh distinction: 'its power is its nature'.
Second, it is shown that a
property formally and in itself is not a principle, by which <something
happens>. First, because in this way the Father likened the Son to him in
fatherhood. Further, because the power is the foundation of relation by which
the one who produces is related to the product, and this cannot be grounded in
the production, as even in creatures (it cannot be grounded in the production),
because it (the relation) is as such in the product, therefore, it is grounded
in the power to produce.
Furthermore, because the power to
generate is prior to the product, hence prior to the Son and, therefore, it is
prior to the Father. Lastly, because the power to generate is a kind of
quality, hence, intrinsically it is not a relation.
Thirdly, I say that a certain
aspect follows this power, namely that the power to generate is the principle
of generation. The principle, however, signifies the order which follows it
(the principle). Hence, the aspect follows the power to generate. Accordingly,
I understand the master who says that the essence insofar as it is fatherhood is
the power to generate. That is true as consequence, not as form or intrinsically.
Furthermore it is argued: in the
Son is the essence, therefore also the power. Similarly, that the Father gives
everything to the Son; in this, he is not distinct.
On the first one has to say that
the potentiality is common, action, however, is not. This is to deduce from the
end of the second Analytics <of Aristotle>, because action is singular,
the potentiality is universal and common. From which I say, it <the action>
does not generate, because the intellect does not remain fruitful in the Son, like the will that remains, for it
generates according to its fatherhood.
Or one has to say: that power,
insofar as it denotes the aspect, is not in the Son, and, therefore, it cannot
become actualized in the Son. And if it is argued that in this way the Son
would not be omnipotent, one has to answer that he turns the ‘what’ into a
‘how’.
What relates to the second topic
results from what has been said before.
Then, one has to say to the
question that there is one act according to the thing, according to the mode of
knowing, however, that it is rather to be taken towards the part of the
substance. Because the relation is a measure from an entity, as the commentator
of Metaphysics XII, note 20 says.
To this argument I partly agree,
but the way it is argued is poor. Because the simply infinite is not, unless it
is one, and this is the essence, as the Damascene says, because it contains
supereminently everything. But infinity, in general, contains supereminently
what is common to that genus, so that it is not inconvenient that such is
multiplied, because they are of different sorts. From this one can derive our
proposition.
Other problems are solved.
Nr. 3 Whether diversity is a real or an intellectual
relation?
Though it seems that it is an intellectual one, because it is the
opposite of identity.
The counter‑argument. It is between what is
really extreme.
To begin with: What does the term 'diversity' mean? Because in the
fifth (book
of the) Metaphysics (it is said):
Diverse is what is diverse from
itself through being totally
diverse, but when
it differs not totally, it is mixed.
Second, how do we understand the term 'relation'?
Some say that is a habit of one’s
nature that exists in the ground, and tends towards a real end, but that
neither the end nor the ground are included in its nature. Because they say
that
<1> certain categories only
refer to the thing,
<2> certain (categories) to
the thing with respect to its habit, as for example the six (categories),
<3> certain the respect as
such, as for example relation.
If, however, the ground were
included, it would predicate what (it is = being) which is against Boethius.
Furthermore: The ground is
absolute. Hence, it is not something of a relation. And if one argues: ‘related
to something else what makes something to what it is asf.’, one conceptualizes
the ground.
In the same way is similarity the
same quality of many.
With regards to the first one has
to say that Aristotle On the Categories
defines what is related, not the relation.
With regards to the second, that
it is a substantial definition.
But others say that ground and
end concur in the constitution of a relation. Namely as matter and form concur
in a species, so also here.
Now, I prove it in the following
way: A relation can neither be conceptualized nor exist without ground.
Therefore it (the ground) belongs to the essence of relation.
But you may say: In this way one
could only argue about the accident. One needs to say …
Furthermore, I argue as follows:
Relation is an accident based on that something is, but that it is an accident derives
from the ground.
Furthermore, there is a
difference between a relation according to species and that other according to
ground, as is obvious from (the difference between) equality and similarity.
Furthermore, relation as such
from another one is not distinguished according to species, hence, the way as
it is. But that it is such, it derives from the ground and the end.
On the first of these, one has to
say: The thing is said with regards to habit and is different from others as
one thing from another, because a thing is differentiated according to the ten
categories. Therefore, relation is not some other category. And if one says:
one thing accords to several categories as, for example, obviously in the case
of knowing, one has to add that a single one in relation to several accords to
(several) categories. Because knowing entails two real (aspects), quality and the
aspect of reality. Hence, I say: relation is different from these six, because
a new relation cannot exist on a new ground, but exists in those six
categories, as becomes obvious from the categories of ‘where’ and of ‘habit’.
And this is what the commentator notes with regards to Metaphysics V, paragraph
28.
Second, the difference exists,
because relation sets the thing in an unspecified way towards something, but
those six (categories) specify the habit of a thing to something else.
Third, the difference exists,
because relation imports more intrinsically a certain aspect, because relation
is by nature of the ground in it, and surfaces from the nature of the ground. The
other six, indeed, do not do such.
On the second, one has to say
that something is substantially predicated.
On the third, one has to say that
it (quality) makes (the species) like matter. Because such species is
constituted by both, but its definition is not compound, because that relation
does not add to the ground and the relation is according to itself.
Hence, one has to reply to the proposition that diversity taken
improperly with regards to similarity etc., then it is a real one. But if it is
taken as opposite to identity, it is an intellectual one, the reason
being that it is immediately based on substance:
Indeed, because there is no
recourse to substance, then because being at presupposes being in, then because
the Philosopher in On the Categories
grounds all relations on accident, then because otherwise there was no
accident. Indeed, relation as a term and concept can be grounded in substance.
And in this way, diversity is a non-essential relation.
But against these: Nowhere, the
philosopher distinguishes between ‘being said’ and ‘being’. Likewise, I say
that such a distinction can easily be found between relatives, but not in
relation.
Thus, it is false that a real
relation cannot be grounded in substance. Because a relation really sets something
else and has a distinct end. And such is God’s relation to the creature.
Further, the white Socrates
concurs according to the species with the white Plato, therefore they are
similar. Thus, Socrates also concurs with Plato in substance, and in this they
are the same of substantial similarity.
Further, if a relation is
grounded in matter, it would have a substrate. On this more in due course.
Then, I say that diversity is a
real relation because it exists in a thing and is followed by a thing out of
the nature of this thing.
Further: three things are
required for a relation, namely
<1> that each of the extremes
is somehow a thing. Therefore, between something and nothing there is no real relation.
Hence, Simplicius: ‘The being of relation is not solitary, it is of one as end,
and of the other as ground’. Therefore by both of them reality is given. In
addition, the ground is substantial, the end formal. Therefore, the relation
between a substance and a form that does not exist, is not a real one.
<2> Second, it is required
that each of the extremes is something supposedly different, because it is
ordered towards something else, and this other is formal. Therefore the
relation of identity is not a real one.
<3> Third, the condition is
that it is a consequence out of the nature of the thing and does not follow an
intellectual order.
But these three belong to the
relation of diversity. Therefore asf.
To the arguments of the opponent
that ‘relation is not grounded in substance, because it does not depend’, one
has to say that, if one accepts dependence, meaning coexistence, then it
belongs to relation, if not, then is like effect to cause, because as such
there were no real relation in God.
On the second where it is said:
‘something is in’, like something superior in something inferior, in another
way like form in substance. And so concede …
On the other (argument) about the
intention of the Philosopher one has to say that the Philosopher said that (the
relation) is grounded on three, because first he has introduced the mode of
power, or (second) the mode of quantity as mode of numbers – and so, substance,
to establish relation, introduces the mode of quantity – or (third) quality.
On the other one has to say that
what it derives from its own nature that is an accident.
On the fifth argument one has to
say that identity is a substantial sameness with oneself, but different is the
identity between two substances.
Nr. 4 Whether the rational difference is prior to the difference
in a thing?
As it seems, yes, because the
attributes differ according to reason.
The counter-argument: The thing
is prior than the ratio.
First on this, what is a real
difference? What has been said of a thing. The thing, however, is distinct in
the way being is [distinct]. Therefore the thing can appropriately be called an
absolute entity.
In another way: What is called a
relation is grounded in an absolute thing. In this way [one has also to think]
about the difference.
In one way, the intellect is
called ratio, in another way conceptualizing is called ratio, but also a thing is
called something that is conceived. Because the thing, in order [to be]
according to itself, is understood in a primary understanding, an understanding
that is grounded in the intellect, for the ascertaining of being.
However, for the ascertaining of
signifying, it [the understanding] is grounded in the thing that it signifies.
So it is also accordingly with the second intentions.
And so is ratio grounded in the
intellect, not in a way that there would be a different ratio in a thing, but
solely compared with the act of the ratio. Hence, to differ according to the
ratio is to differ according to the act of the ratio. As the act of the ratio
is directed towards the conceived thing, in which it is not, it makes this
particular thing to be.
Following this, I answer the
question that the difference according to the thing is prior. Because one
cannot admit a part-difference, as the difference is what a being suffers.
Being, however is entirely either outside of a soul, or in a soul. I prove the
proposition as follows: As the thing is prior to the ratio, so also the real
difference. Likewise the cause is prior to its effect.
Similarly, out of a thing’s
nature, the real difference exists before any intellectual act, but the
rational difference follows the rational act. Hence, all what follows from
this.
Similarly, in …
